| Research investigating the relationship between criminal behavior and the timing of sanctions has proceeded along two separate tracks. The first involves several prominent theories (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985) that consider "impulsivity" a central determinant of criminal behavior. The distinct approach of the deterrence theorists comprises the second track. Personality traits aside, deterrence theory postulates that criminal behavior should relate inversely to the "celerity" with which potential punishment is expected to occur. Underlying this proposition, however, is the assumption that potential offenders prefer to delay punishment. Employing techniques from behavioral economics, this paper shows how the above-described approaches are inextricably related. In particular, it imports the notion of a "discount factor" into the traditional deterrence framework to examine impulsivity and celerity simultaneously. Using survey data, the paper then investigates several hypotheses. First, it assesses the relative predictive capacity of celerity and impulsivity as they relate to offending behavior. Second, it critically examines the major assumption underlying a celerity effect that individuals generally prefer to delay punishment (in economic parlance, that they have a positive discount rate). Finally, the paper explores the implications for offending behavior when this assumption does not hold (when individuals are "negative discounters"). |
Updated 05/20/2006