| Western political and philosophical thought has been dominated by a juridical tradition which is exemplified in Hobbes contractarianism. Juridicism presumes a state of nature where each individual rationally surrenders some of his/her rights to the State in exchange for the regular satisfaction of most of their desires (e.g., for security). The intervention of the State then marks a break with the state of nature and makes sociality possible through the use of reason and suspension of human passions. The State then asserts its power as a function of its legitimacy derived from Reason. Against this, Spinoza presents a conception of society not based on organisation (the imposition of a Form from the outside), but of composition. This rejects the Hobbesian contract on the grounds that surrendering our power to a third party (the State) is antithetical to our interests. The existence of the State, according to Spinoza, does not limit our freedom, but rather by makes that freedom possible by extending our powers. This paper will explore the implications of an anti-juridical conception of the social order and, in particular, its implications for agency which are crucial to both Liberal and Marxist accounts of social change. This theory when applied to criminology may open up new perspectives on questions of criminality and its relation to the State. |
Updated 05/20/2006